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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8227

LESTER DAVEY WELLARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent controverts many of the statements in
the appellant's brief regarding the facts of this case, either
because they relate to facts not found in the record on appeal or because they are not considered accurate. The record on appeal shows the following material facts:
The appellant was convicted in the Third District Court
in Salt Lake County of the crime of issuing a fictitious
check, exhibit S-1, in violation of 76-26-7, U. C. A., 1953.
Trial was by jury, before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, District Judge.
The defendant passed exhibit S-1 at a filling station,
presumably in Salt Lake City; and he passed the check of
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exhibit S-4 at a motel in Nephi, Utah. Exhibit S-1 is a
check to Cash for $12.00 on an Ogden bank, bearing the
name Frank Adams as that of the maker. Exhibit S-4 is
in part a check to Cash for $10.00 on a Logan bank, bearing
the name Vaughn Pugmire as that of the maker.
The defendant's story prior to his arrest, as related by
Norman Hayward, was that he received exhibit S-1 from
a man representing himself to the defendant as Frank
Adams, a resident of Layton, Utah, in payment for some
books he sold to said Adams in Layton in December, 1953.
The defendant described this Frank Adams as a man 28
to 30 years old (R. 14 line 30 to R. 18 line 5). The defendant also said, prior to his arrest, that he had received the
check part of exhibit S-4 from a Mr. Pugmire in Idaho in
payment for some books sold to Pugmire (R. 20 line 21
to R. 21 line 26).
The defendant told Deputy Hayward before he was
arrested that he thought he could locate Frank Adams, the
maker of exhibit S-1, in Layton; however Mr. Hayward
thought it inadvisable to send him to Layton, preferring to
make an independent search (R. 24 lines 20-26).
Deputy Hayward made a search for persons named
Frank Adams in the Salt Lake area and in the Layton area
by means of telephone directories only. He found a Frank
Adams in Salt Lake City who was fifty-eight years old,
and a Frank Adams, with a middle initial, in the Layton
area. He made no search in the Ogden area (R. 27 line 27
to R. 29 line 11).
Frank D. Adams testified for the state that he had
lived in Layton for sixty years and was very well acquainted
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with people named Adams in Davis County because he had
written a published genealogical record of the family lineage
of Elias Adams, presumably an ancestor of the witness.
Mr. Adams testified that there was no other Frank Adams
in Davis County in December, 1953, nor was there at the
time of the trial. The witness did not know the defendant,
and had never seen him until the preliminary hearing was
held. Mr. Adams had neither made nor signed exhibit S-1.
To his knowledge, no Frank Adams worked or was stationed at Clearfield or Hill Field. His father formerly
owned a farm east of Layton, but witness did not remember
any tenants of this farm named Wellard. Mr. Adams operates a large super-market in Layton, and is well-known in
and around Layton.
The defendant testified in his defense, and admitted
having and cashing both exhibit S-1 and exhibit S-4. His
story at the trial was that a man calling himself Frank
Adams made out exhibit S-1 in Layton in December, 1953,
in the defendant's presence (R. 34 lines 28-30), and gave
it to defendant in payment for a dozen books. He did not
know this Frank Adams, and had never seen him before
(R. 41 lines 5-7). Adams purportedly wore a mechanical
leg brace; sold used cars in Layton; and lived east and
north of Layton, possibly at Sahara Village (R. 35 lines
5-17). The defendant required no identification from
Adams before accepting the check. The defendant denied
writing exhibit S-1. He said that he had known Frank D.
Adams, the witness, when defendant was a boy in Layton,
and that he was not the Frank Adams from whom defendant received the check (R. 40 lines 9-18). Defendant had
not seen Frank D. Adams since he was a boy, but he knew
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there had been a Frank Adams in Layton. The defendant
went to Layton prior to the trial, but had been unable to
find any other Frank Adams than the Frank D. Adams who
testified (R. 41 lines 20-30). Defendant said at the trial
that he got the check part of exhibit S-4 from a fellow in
Logan who had it, and not from Vaughn Pugmire (R. 44
line 17 to R. 45 line 6) . He admitted having been convicted
of forgery in Nevada in 1941.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
AN ISSUE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS NOT BEFORE THIS
COURT:
A. THE DENIAL BELOW OF A MOTION TO
DISMISS IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT
WHEN THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT
SUCH A MOTION WAS MADE, ANY REASONS ADVANCED IN SUPPORT THEREOF,
NOR A RULING ON SUCH MOTION.
B. EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD IS NOT
BEFORE THE COURT; AND NO ISSUE AS TO
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS
BEFORE THIS COURT WHEN THE RECORD
ON APPEAL DOES NOT CONTAIN ALL THE
EVIDENCE ADMITTED BELOW.
POINT II
IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE
COURT BELOW TO GIVE INSTRUCTION SIX.
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POINT III
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT APPEARS IN INSTRUCTION SEVEN.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
ONE, REGARDING THE IDEM SONANS RULE.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
EXHIBIT S-4 INTO EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN ISSUE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS NOT BEFORE THIS
COURT:
A. THE DENIAL BELOW OF A MOTION TO
DISMISS IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT
WHEN THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT
SUCH A MOTION WAS MADE, ANY REASONS ADVANCED IN SUPPORT THEREOF,
NOR A RULING ON SUCH MOTION.
B. EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD IS NOT
BEFORE THE COURT; AND NO ISSUE AS TO
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS
BEFORE THIS COURT WHEN THE RECORD
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ON APPEAL DOES NOT CONTAIN ALL THE
EVIDENCE ADMITTED BELOW.

~(

A. The appellant complains in his Point I of the
refusal of the trial court to grant his motion to dismiss,
made at the close of the State's evidence. The record on
appeal, however, does not show that the appellant made
such a motion to the court, that he presented any reasons
to the court which would justify dismissal, nor that the
court ruled on the motion. The only reference to such a
motion to be found in the record is in the third paragraph
of appellant's "Draft of Bill of Exceptions" (R. 70), which
is not properly a part of the record on appeal because it
was never settled nor allowed by the trial judge. This
document might be considered a statement of points on
appeal, but nothing more. It is no more efficacious in supplying the deficiency noted here than is the appellant's
brief.
It is a fundamental and well-settled rule of appellate
procedure that all questions must be tried and determined
by the record as certified to the appellate court. 3 Am. Jur.
284, sec. 692. The appellate court can look only to the record to determine what occurred in the court below. It will
not consider an assignment of error unless the alleged error
affirmatively appears of record. To predicate error upon
the refusal to grant a motion, it must properly appear that
the motion was made and ruled on. 3 Am. Jur. 210, sec.
568; 24 C. J. S. 570, sec. 1783.

In the absence of any showing in the record of a motion to dismiss by the defendant, his reasons in support
thereof, and the ruling thereon, no issue pertaining to such
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motion and the errors assigned in connection therewith is
before this court. Consequently, appellant's Point I must
be disregarded in this appeal.
B. The appellant makes numerous assertions about
the evidence in this case in connection with his assignments.
of error, as well as in his statement of facts. Some of these
assertions refer to evidence not found in the record at all.
Other assertions question the sufficiency or the extent of
the evidence introduced below. The respondent controverts
a number of these assertions by the appellant.
"The brief of an appellant * * * is limited to
error appearing of record. Thus, the intimation of counsel
in his brief on appeal cannot be taken as evidence of a fact
not appearing on the record." 3 Am. Jur. 331, sec. 767.
The court cannot consider evidence not in the record, and
it is improper to make allegations regarding certain evidence when that evidence is not in the record on appeal.
The respondent asks that the court disregard all assertions
in the appellant's brief regarding evidence which is not in
the record.
It appears from an entered order of the trial court
(R. 55) that ten different witnesses testified at the trial,
including the defendant. It appears that the transcript,
however, contains the testimony of but four of these witnesses (R. 8, R. 54). It thus appears of record that not all
the evidence in the case is included in the record on appeal.
It is self-evident that all of the evidence introduced below
must be included in the record on appeal if the appellate
court is to review the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
Therefore no question as to the extent or sufficiency of the
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evidence introduced below is before this court, and it must
be assumed on review that the evidence was sufficient in
extent and probative value to support the verdict and judgment, as well as any intermediate ruling of the trial court
involving the sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant's
complaints of the insufficiency of the evidence must be
disregarded. 3 Am. Jur. 261, sec. 692, and p. 223, sec. 590;
24 C. J. S. 590, sec. 1789.

POINT II
IT VvAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE
COURT BELOW TO GIVE INSTRUCTION SIX.
Instruction number six (R. 47 line 29 to R. 48 line
15) was given to guide the jury in its determination of the
question whether or not the purported maker of exhibit
S-1 existed.
The defendant first contends that this instruction
should not have been given because, he asserts, there was
no evidence of the non-existence of the purported maker
other than that of Deputy Hayward. While it is not clear
just what this has to do with the instruction, it seems to
draw into question the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to justify the instruction on this point. As established in Point I, supra, no such question is before this
court since all of the e.vidence is not in the record. The
respondent, moreover, denies this assertion of the defendant, and points to the testimony of Frank D. Adams (R.
29 line 29 to R. 30 line 23) as further evidence of the nonexistence of the purported maker of exhibit S-1.
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The remainder of defendant's complaints regarding
instruction six are answered by People v. Gordon, 13 Cal.
App. 678, 110 P. 469, 472, a prosecution for forgery on the
theory that the purported maker was fictitious, where it
was held proper to refuse an instruction that the non-existence of the maker must be proved beyond and to the
exclusion of all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty,
and that if the jury had any reasonable doubt as to whether
or not there was in existence anywhere in the world such
a person as the purported maker, on the date in question,
they must resolve the question in favor of the defendant.
The court said that the state certainly was not required to
prove, nor were the jury required to believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no such person in the world
as the purported maker of the instrument; but it was only
necessary to show to a common certainty that there was no
such person in existence in the vicinity of and connected
with the particular acts charged, in the place and county
where jurisdiction accrued. The Gordon case was approved
and followed in People v. Reed, 84 Cal. App. 685, 258 P.
463, 464, which was in turn followed in People v. Menne,
4 Cal. App. 2d 91, 41 P. 2d 383, 389. The Reed and Menne
cases were prosecutions under section 476 of the California
Penal Code, which is the source of, and almost identical to,
section 76-26-7, U. C. A., 1953. State v. Tinnin, 64 U. 587,
232 P. 543, 43 A. L. R. 46.
It is perfectly obvious that some sort of limitation
must be placed on the necessity of proving non-existence
under 76-26-7 or that law would be nullified, as stated in
the Reed case cited. The defendant contends, however, that
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Instruction six er_red in limiting the need for proof to Davis
County when exhibit S-1 is drawn on an Ogden bank and
was passed in Salt Lake County. To this, the respondent
answers that the defendant himself is responsible for this
limitation and therefore has no cause to complain. The defendant represented that the purported maker of exhibit
S-1 lived in or near Layton, both before defendant's arrest
and at his trial. This necessarily restricted the question of
the alleged maker's existence to the Layton area. The matter was localized and placed in issue by the defendant himself, and he cannot be heard to assume a different or incompatible position on appeal.
Instruction six comported fully with the law and facts
of this case.

!.

.,
'

POINT III
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT APPEARS IN INSTRUCTION SEVEN.
The defendant contends that prejudicial error was
committed by the trial court in giving the third paragraph
of instruction seven (R. 48 lines 23-25) because the facts
proved at the trial did not justify-indeed, precluded-such
an instruction. This seems to be a complaint that the verdict should have been directed for the defendant on this
point. If so, it is also apparently a complaint that the court
failed to act on its own motion in accord with the silent
desires of the defendant, for the record shows no motion
by the defendant raising the point.
The court, in instruction seven, listed the elements of
the crime charged against the defendant, telling the jury,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J~

11
inter alia, that in order to find the defendant guilty of the
crime charged it would have to find that the purported
maker of exhibit S-1 did not exist. It cannot be denied that
paragraph three (the second element) of this instruction
correctly stated a necessary finding to sustain a conviction
under the statute, 76-26-7, and that is all it pretended to
do. See State v. Jensen, 103 U. 478, 136 P. 2d 949, 953,
where the elements of this crime are enumerated.
Indeed, it seems clear that any error committed here
was in favor of the defendant, as the instruction required
the jury to find each of the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and non-existence need not be shown that conclusively. People v. Gordon, 13 Cal. App. 678, 110 P. 469, 472;
People v. Reed, 84 Cal. App. 685, 258 P. 463, 464; People
v. Menne, 4 Cal. App. 2d 91, 41 P. 2d 383, 389.
The court below, of course, was required to instruct the
jury as to the law, not the facts. Should the court, however, have given this instruction "* * * in the face of
* * *" evidence of the existence of at least one Frank
Adams in the area involved in the case, and in the absence
of any motions or requests by the defendant? The trial
judge is not obliged to direct a verdict for the defendant
on his own motion unless the questions of law and fact are
clearly and unequivocally in favor of the defendant, if ever,
and unless such action is required to avoid an obvious miscarriage of justice. The court is not obligated to conduct
the defense of the accused.
In People v. Terrill, 133 Cal. 120, 65 P. 303, the defendant was convicted under the California equivalent of
our section 76-26-7; and he urged, on appeal, that the evi-
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dence below disclosed the existence of the person claimed
to be fictitious. Venue was in Santa Clara county, and the
prosecution offered evidence to show that no such man as
Leon McAbee, the purported maker of the note in question,
existed in that county. It appeared from the evidence that
the purported 1naker was a male person. The defendant
showed the existence of a married woman named Leon
McAbee in the same county, though she apparently was
not present at the trial. The court, nevertheless, said,
"There is no evidence tending to show that the signature
purported to be hers," in affirming the conviction. See
also People v. Bernard, 21 Cal. App. 56, 130 P. 1063, and
People v. Lucas, 67 Cal. App. 452, 227 P. 709.
Under these cases, no prejudicial error occurred in giving instruction seven and in failing to direct this point for
defendant on the court's own motion.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
ONE, REGARDING THE IDEM SONANS RULE.
Defendant complains of the refusal of the trial court
to give his requested instruction number one (R. 58).
The request was to instruct the jury that names which
are either identical or idem sonans presumably refer to
identical persons, and that this presumption is rebutted by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to the contrary.
If for no other reason, the court below properly refused to give such an instruction because no rule of law
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would require the rebuttal beyond a reasonable doubt of
such a presumption. Indeed, it has been held that the prima
facie presumption of identity of person arising from the
identity or similarity of names is liable to be shaken by the
slightest proof of facts which produce a doubt as to identity.
King v. Slepka, 194 Okla. 11, 146 P. 2d 1002, 1005.
If it is assumed, solely for argument and without conceding, that a proper idem sonans instruction should have
been given, it nevertheless was not reversible error to fail
to give it; for any presumption raised by the similarity of
the names involved had been sufficiently rebutted by the
defendant's own testimony by the time the trial had ended.
Defendant testified (R. 40, lines 9 to 18) that the witness
Frank D. Adams was not the person representing himself
as Frank Adams who allegedly had made out the check.
The jury could not at the same time have believed defendant's testimony and also have believed that the Frank
Adams of Exhibit S-1 and Frank D. Adams were the same
person. Defendant cannot be heard to assert a presumption
on appeal which is contradicted by his own direct testimony
at the trial. This would be contrary to reason as well as
the rule of law that an appellant will not be heard to take a
position on appeal inconsistent with that adopted below.

Rebuttable presumptions are usually nothing more than
crutches used by courts as a substitute for the facts, and
when the facts appear there is no need to use the crutch.
Certainly it would be nonsensical to require or permit a rebuttable presumption to oppose, or be weighed against,
facts which clearly and unmistakably rebut that presumption.
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The defendant rebutted his own presumption, and there
was no error committed by the court in refusing to submit
the presumption to the jury.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
EXHIBIT S-4 INTO EVIDENCE.
Exhibit S-4 consists of a check and a bank notice
stapled together. The defendant admitted cashing the check
in Nephi. Exhibit S-4 was admitted in evidence over the
objection of appellant that it was immaterial and incompetent (R. 22 line 10). At the time S-4 was admitted, the
court specially instructed the jury regarding the limited
purpose for which it could be considered (R. 22 line 30 to
R. 23 line 24). The record reveals no objection nor exception to this special instruction, nor does it show that defendant requested any additional instruction relative to this
exhibit.
Defendant complains of the admission of exhibit S-4
and complains that the special instruction given at the time
was ambiguous, confusing, and failed to define a fictitious
check.
The complaints regarding the instruction are made for
the first time on appeal, and therefore, under the general
rule, should be disregarded by this court. 3 Am. J ur. 25,
sec. 246; 24 C. J. S. 268, sec. 1669, and p. 299, sec. 1674.
State v. Gorham, 93 U. 274, 72 P. 2d 656, 664. The alleged
errors, if any exist, could easily have been corrected at the
time upon application to the trial court.
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Moreover, the respondent finds no prejudicial error.
It may be noted that defendant's complaint that the in-

struction was in error in requiring the jury to ignore exhibit S-4 until S-1 was found to be fictitious is really a
complaint about the order of proof permitted by the court,
as the defendant would be the last to say that S-4 should
have been admitted without a limiting instruction. The
other alternatives are to exclude exhibit S-4 entirely, or
to delay its admission until S-1 has been found fictitious.
The order of proof is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. State v. Pollock et al.,
102 U. 587, 129 P. 2d 554, 557; State v. Olson, 75 U. 583,
287 P. 181, 185. There is, a fortiori, no requirement that
a jury return a special verdict as to one element of a crime
before it may consider evidence as to another element of
the crime. See also Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., sec. 307.
Nor is there any rule of law which would require that the
special instruction given contain a definition of a fictitious
check. A definition of this term was given in the general
instructions, and that is sufficient. Defendant fails to sustain his burden on appeal regarding these complaints.
Because the record does not contain all the evidence
admitted below, it must be assumed that exhibit S-4 was
properly identified, that sufficient foundation was laid for
its reception, that it was shown to be relevant to the issue
of intent, and that, in general, S-4 and its supporting evidence were in all respects sufficient to justify its consideration by the jury for the limited purpose for which it
was admitted. See Point I-B, supra.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
The only real question, then, presented to the court by
defendant's Point 5 is that of the admissibility of a check
on which the charge against him was not based and which
tends to show the commission of a distinct offense by the
defendant.
Wigmore states the correct general principle to be that
all facts affording any reasonable inference as to the act
charged are relevant and admissible, including facts showing design, motive, knowledge, intent, and so forth, where
these matters are in issue or relevant. To this general rule
there is the important exception that conduct tending and
offered as evidence to show bad moral character is inadmissible. Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 216, p. 716. The exception
is not made because evidence of bad moral character is
irrelevant, but rather because its prejudicial effect exceeds
too far its probative value. Therefore, to protect the innocent, wise policy excludes evidence offered to show bad
character. Wigmore, sec. 193, 194. As long, however, as
evidence is not introduced to show the bad moral character
of the defendant, but is introduced relevant to a material
issue in the case, it comes within the general principle
stated and is admissible. If the evidence also tends to show
the bad moral character of the defendant, it should be limited by instruction to consideration for its legitimate purpose. Wigmore, sec. 216, p. 712. He points out that this
result is sustained also by the fundamental principle that
admissibility for one purpose is not affected by inadmissibility for another. Sec. 216, p. 716. State v. Cooper, 114 U.
531, 201 P. 2d 764, 768. The criminality of other acts of
defendant offered in evidence does not affect their admissi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.;:

(::

17
bility. The test is whether or not such acts are relevant to
an issue in the trial other than the character of the defendant. Wig., sec. 305, p. 205. See also sections 300, 302,
and 309 et seq.
A number of the earlier Utah cases espoused the idea
that the admissibility of evidence of other offenses is the
exception rather than the rule. That concept, however, was
expressly abandoned in this state by the Court in State v.
Scott, 111 U. 9, 175 P. 2d 1016, 1021, in favor of the more
general and cogent analysis of Wigmore as adopted by the
Model Code of Evidence. See State v. Green, 89 U. 437,
57 P. 2d 750, 756; State v. Nemier et al., 106 U. 307, 148
P. 2d 327, 329; State v. Prettyman, 113 U. 36, 191 P. 2d
142, 146; and State v. Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 P. 2d 764,
767.
The rule that evidence of other offenses by the defendant, if relevant, is admissible against him to show the
intent with which he committed the act charged is too wellestablished, in this and other jurisdictions, to be controverted. The intent with which the present defendant passed
exhibit S-1 was in issue at his trial. Therefore exhibit S-4
was properly admitted and limited to this issue, its relevancy being assumed as stated above.
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CONCLUSION
The defendant was lawfully and justly convicted by a
jury having full possession of the facts and operating under
instructions which erred only in favor of the defendant.
He fails to carry his burden of showing that his trial was
tainted by prejudicial error.
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WOODRUFF C. GWYNN,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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